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INTRODUCTION

Similar Japanese and Chinese attitudes towards contractual
agreements are reflected in drafting form and in substantive provisions. This similarity of attitudes stems from the position of compromise as a primary means of dispute resolution in each
country's legal system. The primacy of compromise is reflected in
simply drafted agreement provisions and the use of the expressions "friendly" and "mutual discussion" as the method by which
to settle, for example, payment problems and disputes in the interpretation of a particular agreement. Although arbitration is provided for in all Japan-People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) agreements, the requirement that each party receive the approval of its
national government to give full force and effect to an arbitration
tribunal's decision underlines the mutual preference for settling
disputes by friendly and mutual discussions. 1
This article intends to demonstrate the similarity of Japanese
and Chinese attitudes towards contractual agreements by contrasting Japan-.P.R.C. agreements with Japan-United States and
Japan-third world agreements. This similarity of attitudes, the
structural support framework for bilateral trade, technology, and
after-sales service can explain Japan's success in trading with the
P.R.C.
Section II will examine Japanese attitudes towards domestic
commercial agreements and explain w by this domestic model is
used in business transactions with the P .R.C. Section III will set
out the structural framework of trade between Japan and the
P.R.C. prior to and after the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two countries in 1972. This section will thereafter
focus on the contrast in content between the J apan-P .R.C. Agreement Concerning Trade 2 and the U .S.-J a pan Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation. 3 Section IV will examine current
forms of Japan-P.R.C. commercial transactions and focus on dif1. NI-CHUBOEKI HIKKEI (MANUAL OF JAPAN-CHINA TRADE), 43 JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR
THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1979).
2. Nippon-koku to chuka-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no boeki ni kansuru kyotei
(Agreement Between Japan and the People's Republic of China Concerning Trade), 93
GENKO-HOKI SORAN (ALL EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS) (Joyaku [Treaties]), 2171-162 to
2171-163-3 (effective Sept. 15, i974), [hereinafter cited as Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement].
3. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Between the United States of
America and Japan, done April 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063-2084 T.l.A.S. No. 2863 (effective Oct.
30, 1953), '(hereinafter cited as U.S.-Japan Treaty].
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ferences among selected Japan-P.R.C., Japan-U.S., and Japanthird world commercial agreements.
The Japan-P.R.C. paradigm of commercial agreements is
worthy of study by U.S. lawyers and businessmen engaging in
commercial transactions with the P.R.C. Although U.S. legal attitudes and Japanese-Chinese attitudes towards the detail of contract provisions differ, the success of Japan in trading with the
P.R.C. should give pause to U.S. lawyers and businessmen to
rethink the necessity of offering detailed draft proposals to P .R.C.
enterprises. Indeed, P.R.C. government officials have stated that
Japan-P.R.C. commercial agreements should be studied as model
cases by other countries. 4

IL

JAPANESE DOMESTIC MODEL OF CONTRACTS AND
WHY THIS MODEL IS USED IN JAPAN-P.R.C.
AGREEMENTS

A.

Japanese Attitudes Towards Commercial Agreements:
Views of Rights and Obligations

Commercial agreements between Japanese and foreign enterprises may be divided into three paradigms, Japan-U.S., Japanthird world, and Japan-P.R.C. Focusing on licensing agreements,
for example, a Japan-U.S. agreement where the licensor is a U.S.
corporation and the licensee a Japanese corporation will usually
contain detailed clauses as to exclusivity, royalty calculation
(minimum royalty and periodic payments), the licensee's obligation
to protect licensed patents and trademarks against infringement
claims, marking of licensed products by the licensee, warranty
disclaimer, confidentiality obligation of the licensee, technical
assistance, and arbitration in accordance with the U .S.-J a pan
Trade Arbitration Agreement of September 16, 1952.5
4. This statement was made by Ma-Yi, Vice Minister, P.R.C. State Economic Com
mission and Fang Zhichun and Gan Ziyu, Vice Ministers, P.R.C.-Japan Planning Commission. A. Moroguchi, Goben mondai no chugoku-gawa no kangaekata (Chinese Side's Way of
Thinking With Respect to Joint Venture Problems), 78 Nicchukeizaikyokai (Japan China
Association of Economy and Trade Report) 9 (Jan. 1980), [hereinafter cited as Goben mondai].
5. Agreement Between the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association and the
American Arbitration Association to Facilitate the Use of Commercial Arbitration in Trade
Between Japan and the United States of America, September 15, 1952; CHUSAI-HOKI-SHU
(COLLECTION OF ARBITRATION LAWS) at 111-1 to III-4, Kokusaishojichusaikyokai (International
Commercial Arbitration Association) (1972), [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Agreement].
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A Japan-third world agreement with a Japanese licensor and
third world licensee will contain detailed clauses in favor of the
Japanese party, such as:
licensor's technical personnel will be dispatched to licensee's
plant for technical guidance and licensee's personnel accepted at
licensor's Japan plant for three months total each, during the
term of the agreement. Expenses will be paid by licensee several
weeks in advance of departure of licensor's staff to licensee's
plant, or prior to arrival in Japan of licensee's staff. 6

Japanese corporate personnel and attorneys 7 explain the need
for detailed drafting in the Japan-U.S. and Japan-third world
models in terms of each party's legal consciousness. In the United
States, contract law doctrine, including the statute of frauds and
the parol evidence rule, leads to detailed contract provisions. 8 If
the Japanese party does not agree on such detailed drafting,
generally, the United States side will not conclude the agreement,
especially if it is a licensing agreement. With third world agreements, the Japanese party is anxious to protect its confidential
know-how and to obtain payment. In those third world countries
with a British colonial past, the contract law statute of frauds and
the parol evidence rule also demand detailed drafting. 9
To understand the Japan-P.R.C. paradigm, it is necessary to
explain Japanese attitudes towards domestic commercial agreements and why the domestic model is used in transactions with
China. Japanese merchants view a contractual relationship as one
of cooperation, friendship, and co-reliance. 10 Thus, rights and
obligations are not perceived as being limited within the "four corners" of a contract. Rather, there is a tacit understanding between
6. This information was drawn from a number of agreements reviewed by the
authors.
7. Interview with Professor M. Young, visiting research scholar, Faculty of Law,
University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan, April 21, 1980.
8. U.C.C. § 2-201 (Statute of Frauds) provides in pertinent part, "a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable ... unless there is some writing
... ," and § 2-202 (Parol ... Evidence) provides in pertinent part, "[t]erms ... in ... writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement ... may not be contradicted
by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."
9. For the English common law statute of frauds see, The Statute of Frauds at
178-96 and for parol evidence see, The Contents of the Contract at 113, in M.P. FuRMSTON,
LAW OF CONTRACT (9th ed. 1976).
10. Wagakuni ni okeru keiyaku-kan (1) (Views of contracts in Japan (1)), No. 200 NBL
at 6-7 (Jan. 1980).
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the parties regarding the extent to which contract provisions shall
impose an obligation on one party and grant a right to the other
party. This tacit understanding stems from lengthy negotiations
which invariably precede the conclusion of a complex commercial
agreement. In the case of a licensing agreement, the parties will
engage in negotiations over a period of months or even years.
The first step in negotiations calls for each side to become
well acquainted with members of the other side. To company
management the character of the individuals in a prospective
licensee's management is important. In addition, good social relations allow for a more relaxed negotiating atmosphere and a
deeper understanding of the other side's way of thinking.
At the conference table, each side's understanding of the
other theoretically lessens the necessity of drafting detailed contract provisions. 11 Additionally, there are other beliefs underlying
the emphasis on tacit understanding. The stipulation of detailed
rights and obligations indicates distrust between the parties. 12
Furthermore, detailed provisions cannot foresee future situations.
It is preferable to settle problems on a case-by-case basis through
friendly discussion and co-reliance. This friendly discussion and coreliance is possible only when a working relationship of trust has
been built between the parties. Finally, the Japanese character is
such that it is imperative to consider the other party's position at
all times. 13
Provisions in Japanese domestic commercial agreements
often contain such ambiguous expressions as "friendly discussion,"
11. But see NIPPON-JIN NO HO-ISHIKI (LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF JAPANESE) at 88 (ed.
Nihonbunkakaigi [Japan Cultural Conference) 1973), in which 88.5% of those questioned in a
survey expressed a preference for concrete, detailed contracts as opposed to 8.5% who expressed a preference for simple contracts.
12. The following volumes are references stating the Japanese view towards contracts: E. Hoshino, Gendai ni okeru keiyaku (Contracts in Modern Times), MINPO RON'SHU (3)
(ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL CODE (3)) (1972); T. KAWASHIMA, NIPPON-JIN NO HO-ISHIKI (JAPANESE CONSCIOUSNESS OF LAW) (1967); J. Kamishima, T. Sawaki, K. Tokoro and T. Amaji, Nippon-jin no
keiyaku-kan (Japanese Views of Contracts), NIPPON-JIN TO HO (JAPANESE AND LAW) (1978);
Wagakuni ni okeru keiyaku-kan (1)(2)(3)(4) (Views of Contracts in Japan (1)(2)(9)(4)), Nos. 200
to 203 NBL (Jan. and Feb. 1980); W. Kashiwagi, Sho-torihiki no jissai to genko-keiyakuho:
business-kai ga nozomu keiyakuho no gendaika (Practice of Commercial Transactions and
Current Contract Law: Modernization of Contract Law Desired by Business Circles), No. 33
NBL at 33-39 (Oct. 1974).
13. Y. Ishida, Nippon to obei no keiyaku ni tsuite no kangae-kata (Japanese and
European-American Views of Contracts), Nos. 7-8 KOKUSAI-SHOJI-HOMU (1979).
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"cooperate," "sufficient," "necessary" and "mutually acceptable." 14
These ambiguous provisions reflect the mutual trust and tacit
understanding which exists between the parties. Ambiguous provisions also permit flexibility in interpretation of agreement
clauses in the future.
Domestic commercial agreements, generally, do not contain
"whereas," jurisdiction, or arbitration clauses. "Whereas" clauses
are viewed as inadequate to express relations between the contracting parties. Jurisdiction clauses are not viewed as necessary
for a variety of reasons. First, one party's insistence on the inclusion of a jurisdiction clause would be viewed by the other party as
a lack of trust. Second, even though Japanese district courts are
generally limited in jurisdiction to the prefecture in which they are
located, many Japanese companies have offices in large population
centers. Accordingly, it is convenient for one party to travel to the
other party's location to bring suit. 15 Arbitration in domestic contracts is not familiar in J apan. 16 Rather, compromise fulfills the
function which arbitration performs in U.S. domestic commercial
agreements when it is specified in an agreement. A final factor is
that Japanese parties often trust public bodies such as courts. 17 A
domestic form licensing agreement used in Japan is included in
the Appendix as an illustration of the simplicity and brevity of
commercial agreements in Japan.
A lawyer's review of domestic contract provisions usually
does not occur until a serious dispute has surfaced. As a general
rule, Japanese corporate personnel consider the review by a
lawyer of a domestic commercial agreement to be a sign of lack of
mutual trust between the parties. Also, the limited number of
lawyers in Japan 18 and the lawyer's traditional role as essentially a
litigator indicate a preference for thorough review of domestic
14. Many Japanese domestic contracts contain such provisions as, "if any problems occur with regard to this contract, the parties shall discuss in good faith." Legally, it may be
stated that the parties carry on mutual discussions based on this provision.
15. Distances are short in Japan. For example, from Tokyo to Osaka it is only 545
kilometers.
16. In certain contracts, for example, construction contracts, an arbitration clause
must be included. See Kensetsugyoho (Construction Business Law), article 19-11, (1956) as
discussed in Kenchiku no horitsu-sodan (CONSULTATIONS ON CONSTRUCTION) at 277-281 (1970).
17. NIPPON-JIN NO HO-ISHIKI, supra note 11, at 74, 94, 164.
18. At present there are 11,536 licensed attorneys in Japan, Nippon-bengoshi-rengokai kaiin meibo (Register of Japan Federation of Bar Associations) (July l, 1979).
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commercial agreements before a dispute arises. 19
In contrast, Japanese lawyers generally review international
commercial agreements during the drafting and negotiation
stages. However, Japanese lawyers generally do not participate in
negotiations between a client and contract party leading to the
conclusion of an international agreement. This contrasts with the
general practice in the United States of including lawyers in
similar contract negotiations.
When disputes arise between parties to a domestic commercial agreement, every effort is made to reach a settlement through
friendly discussions. These discussions usually involve the participation of personnel of the respective contracting parties only.
If possible, the parties will strive to maintain an amicable relationship between the contracting parties and at the same time avoid a
loss of face by either party .20 This method of agreement is sanctioned by Article 695 , of the Civil Code, which provides that, "a
compromise becomes effective when the parties have agreed to
terminate a dispute between them by mutual concessions." 21
19. Professor M. Young has suggested that according to preliminary investigations,
Japanese attorneys in Tokyo spend an average of 15% -20% of their time reviewing contracts.
20. See Ohta and Hozumi, Compromise in the Course of Litigation, 6 LAW IN JAPAN:
AN ANNUAL 97, 99-101 (1973).
21. There are two forms of compromise recognized under Japanese law: out-of-court
compromise and compromise during the course of litigation. Out-of-court compromise has
the same effect as judgment when the parties declare the particulars of their agreement to
the court in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. Compromise during the course of
litigation also has the same effect as a judgment. Compromise provisions are as follows:
CIVIL CODE (Japan, 1896)
(Compromise)
Article 695. A compromise becomes effective when the parties have agreed to
terminate a dispute between them by mutual concessions.
(Effect)
Article 698. If, in cases where it has, by a compromise, been admitted that one
of the parties possesses the right constituting the object of a dispute or that the
other party does not possess such right, it has afterwards been established that
the former party did not possess the right or that the other party did possess the
same, such right shall be treated as having by virtue of the compromise been
transferred to the former party or extinguished as the case may be.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Japan, 1890).
(Attempt of compromise)
Article 136. The court may, whatever stage the suit may be in, attempt to
carry out compromise or have a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge try the
same.
2. The court, a commissioned judge or an entrusted judge may for compromise
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If, subsequent to friendly discussions, one party files a suit in
court, compromise during the course of litigation is provided for
by Article 136 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21 • 1 This article permits a judge to attempt to carry out a compromise at any time
during the course of litigation. Compromise negotiations may be
commenced at the initiative of either of the parties or by the
court. The active position of a judge in the Japanese civil law
system, in contrast to the passive role of judges in the United
States, facilitates judicial initiative. 22
The pitfall of agreeing to a judge-initiated compromise is that
both parties may feel they have been forced to accept a solution.
Parties to a lawsuit in Japan tend to be reluctant to challenge a
judge's suggestion, since such challenge tends to result in a decision unfavorable to the party refusing to compromise. 23 In addition, lawsuits in Japan tend to be lengthy, resulting in high litigation fees. 24 Even when a favorable judgment is obtained, enforceorder the principal party or his legal representative to appear before court.
(Effect of protocol of compromise, waiver, or admission)
Article 203. In case a compromise, waiver of claim or admission has been
entered in a protocol, such entry shall have the same effect as a judgment becoming final and conclusive.
(Compromise prior to institution of complaint)
Article 356. The parties may, regarding a civil controversy, bring a motion for
compromise before the summary court located in the place where the general
forum of the other party exists by setting forth the purport and ground for claim
as well as the actual circumstances of the controversy.
2. On a compromise being arranged, it shall be entered in the protocol.
3. In the event that a compromise is not arranged, the court shall, upon motion of both parties appeared on the date for compromise, order them to forthwith
proceed to oral argument of the suit. In this case the movant of compromise shall
be deemed to have instituted suit at the time when he made the motion and the expenses for compromise shall be made a part of court costs.
4. In the event that the movant or the other party does not appear on the date
for compromise, the court may deem the proposed compromise to be a failure.
21.1 Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 21, art. 136.
22. The active role of a Japanese judge aids the in-court compromise process. Issues,
e.g., are defined through pleadings and through the judge's questioning of the parties and
witnesses. The judge often suggests compromise to the parties and helps to fashion a compromise solution to the issues in dispute. S. Muto, Concerning Trial Leadership in Civil
Litigation: Focusing on Judge's Inquiry and Compromise in COMPARATIVE LAW: JAPANESE
LAW C-133-C-157 (Y. Nagashima, course materials, Harvard Law School, Fall 1978).
23. See Ohta and Hozumi, Compromise in the Course of Litigation, supra note 20, at
102-106.
24. In one patent infringement case, for example, stamp tax for a 4- 1/2 year trial
(March, 1966-September, 1970) amounted to ii529,000 (@250ii/$US1 = $2,116), lawyers'
fees conceivably amounted to ii5,000,000 ($20,000) on a recovery of i130,000,000 ($120,000).
American Cyanamid Co., Inc. v. Nissan Chemical K.K. (Toyama Dist. Ct. 1970), reprinted in
K. OGAWA, PATENT SENSO (PATENT WAR) at 76-87 (1977).
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ment may take up to five years due to various procedural delaying
tactics which are available to the losing party .25
Compromise may thus be viewed from two perspectives. The
first is each party's desire to avoid losing face and to arrive at a
solution which will retain the basis for possible future business
relations, or at the very least, maintain a good reputation in trade
circles. The second is the prohibitive cost of litigation and enforcement, and the hesitancy of the parties to clash with a judge's suggestion.
Even though Japanese corporations draft detailed international commercial agreements, the strong preference for flexibility
in interpretation of provisions and the use of compromise to settle
disputes remains. At times, this leads to serious disputes. One
leading example, the Australian sugar dispute, 26 illustrates the
Japanese side's desire for flexibility in a change of commodity
market price situation.
In December of 1974 thirty-one Japanese sugar companies
and the Colonial Sugar Refinery of Australia agreed on a long25. If, for example, plaintiff recovers a ~10 million judgment against defendant and
this decision is affirmed on appeal, plaintiff must undertake a compulsory procedure to
recover. Let us assume that the defendant has funds in the bank, land, and goods produced
by defendant. Delaying tactics often used by defendant to hinder plaintiff's compulsory execution are: (1) refusal to accept service of decision; (2) plaintiff applies to court for execution against bank deposit and court issues order. to bank (which takes two to three weeks).
(This delay gives defendant an opportunity to transfer funds as defendant has notice that
plaintiff has applied for order); (3) Plaintiff may request the court to sell defendant's land.
Defendant may object to granting of order for sale of land and thereafter may object to each
procedure of the court. As this is a kind of regular litigation procedure, this process will
take up to three years. Even if plaintiff wins, official sales are usually held only once every
four months. Also, it is usually difficult to sell the land at the fair market value. Each time
the sale fails, ten percent is deducted from the asking price. The sale of land may last up to
an additional three years; and (4) in the case of goods, plaintiff must apply for sale of defendant's goods. This is at times difficult to achieve as title to goods is often unclear. As with
land, there are several processes: e.g., (1) oppose the plaintiff in obtaining a court order, and
(2) object to order on the grounds that goods belong to third party. This process will often
last up to three years. M. Ujiie, Bengoshi kara mita minji-saiban (1J (Ci vil Trial From A
Lawyer's Viewpoint), in GENDAI-SHAKAI TO BENGOSHI (CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND
LAWYERS), at 119-125 (August, 1977).
In response to the amount of time spent in compulsory execution, the Diet (Japanese
parliament) pa<5sed a completely new compulsory execution law in November, 1979 which
will come into force on October 1, 1980. The main purpose of the law is to speed the compulsory execution process. Urano, Minji-shikko-ho seitei no keika to igi ni tsuite (Process
and Meaning in the Establishment of the Civil Compulsory Law) 30 JIYU TO SEIGI (LIBEHTY
AND JUSTICE) 2-8 (December 1979).
26. "Nichi-go keiyaku-kosho no nokoshita kyokun" ("Lessons from the Negotiations
Between Japan and Australia Regarding Sugar"), in Wagakuni ni okeru keiyaku-kan (1),
supra note 10, at II, § 2.

Published by SURFACE, 1979

9

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1979], Art. 4

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

62

[Vol. 7:53

term sugar supply contract for the supply of 600,000 tons of sugar
per year for five years at a price of 229 pounds sterling per ton.
This price was approximately one-half the international market
price when the contract was executed. Subsequent to the execution of the contract, the world market price of sugar decreased
substantially.
The Japanese side requested a lowering of the contract price
based upon the principle of changed circumstances, despite the
fact that the contract provisions did not recognize a drop in the
market price as justifying a downward adjustment in the contract
price. The Japanese side based its reasoning on the notion that
compromise in light of changed circumstances was justifiable. This
position is often adopted by one side in Japanese domestic contract disputes, and parties often compromise on this basis.
The Australian side refused this request and applied for arbitration. The Japanese side managed to delay the actual arbitration proceedings through negotiations to the point where the
Australian side agreed to a downward price adjustment. A compromise agreement was reached in 1976 after two years of
negotiations. 26 • 1

B.

Application of Japanese Domestic Model to Japan-P.R. C.
Agreements and Why the P.R. C. Perceives Japan as a Model

From the Japanese perspective, a mixture of emotional and
practical factors explains the application of simply drafted commercial agreements to agreements with the P.R.C. These include
cultural affinity, lingering guilt over World War II, and the view
that China is a natural trading partner.
Although vastly different, the adoption by Japan of Chinese
language ideographs, Confucian social ethics, Buddhism, and early
Chinese administrative legal structures has greatly influenced
Japanese respect for Chinese culture. These cultural factors have
enabled Japanese businessmen, for example, to feel more at ease
when negotiating a commercial agreement with the P .R.C. than
with U.S. corporations.
Japanese enterprises are eager to cooperate with the P.R.C.
in the development of natural resources. Such development, it is
hoped, will provide Japan with a secure supply of raw materials.
Also Japanese businessmen are eager to invest in labor intensive
26.1 Id.
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industries in the P.R.C. as many of these industries, e.g. textiles,
have become unprofitable in Japan.
Finally, Japanese businessmen believe that the P.R.C. has a
similar attitude towards contracts. P.R.C. draft agreement proposals are also simply drafted. Numerous provisions in such drafts
provide for settlement of issues via friendly or mutual discussion,
as is the case in Japanese domestic commercial agreements.
Japanese businessmen are also aware of the historical primacy of
compromise in the Chinese legal system. 27
From the Chinese perspective, Japan is admired as the only
Asian country to have modernized independent of domination by
western countries. In addition, the Chinese are aware of the
cultural affinity, and believe that Japan is a natural trading partner. Despite differences in political theory, certain Chinese
leaders admire the collective spirit of Japanese workers as
demonstrated by their loyalty to their employer. 28 This collective
spirit and the willingness to work hard are models which the
P.R.C. seeks to emulate.
In negotiations leading to the conclusion of commercial
agreements, P .R.C. enterprise personnel often spend a good
amount of time socializing with their Japanese counterparts.
P.R.C. negotiators believe that it is important to become acquainted with the other side's personality and, as a result, ascertain character prior to engaging in serious negotiations. 29
The P.R.C. is also eager to obtain Japanese know-how in exchange for natural resources and labor intensive products. To the
Chinese, Japanese know-how includes technology, quality control
techniques, and management systems. 30 Accordingly, Japan-P.R.C.
licensing agreements include all three of these items, as further
discussed in Section IV.
An additional factor from the Chinese perspective is the
primacy of mediation as a form of dispute resolution. Traditionally, the Chinese have avoided litigation wherever possible resort27. Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist
China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284 (1967); Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1966); and Marks, In-Court and Out-of-Court Mediation: A Comparative Study of Taiwan, New York, and Wisconsin (unpublished seminar paper, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, Spring, 1975).
28. Goben monda~ supra note 4.
29. Ching, China's Prejudices Confront Capitalism, The Asian Wall Street Journal,
April 4, 1980, at 6.
30. Goben mondai, supra note 4.
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ing instead to mediation. 31 Subsequent to the founding of the
P.R.C. in 1949, the government and the Communist Party emphasized the primacy of mediation as the preferred means of settling disputes. Although cast in the ideological terms of "persuasion
by the masses" to achieve "correct thought," the essence of mediation remains the voluntary consent of both disputants to the suggestions of a third party. 32
At present, civil procedure law provides that, in civil cases,
the parties may engage in mediation under the auspices of the
mediation committee before proceeding to litigation. 33 While international commercial agreements are not subject to this provision,
the obligation of parties to engage in friendly or mutual discussions to solve disputes before proceeding to arbitration
demonstrates the applicability of this concept.

III.

THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF JAPAN-P.R.C.
TRADE AND CONTRASTS BETWEEN JAPAN-P.R.C.
AND JAPAN-U.S. GOVERNMENT LEVEL AGREEMENTS

A.

Pre-1972 Structural Framework

Between 1952 and 1958, trade between the P.R.C. and Japan
was based on four consecutive agreements employing the barter
system of trade. 34 These agreements were executed between the
31. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, supra note 27.
32. Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist
China, supra note 27.
33. FALU CHANGZHI SHOUTSE (HANDBOOK ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE) 165 (ed. Jin Mo-sheng,
1979); and FALU ZHISHI WENDA (QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON LEGAL KNOWLEDGE) 202-203 (ed.
Chen Chun-lung, 1979).
34. The four agreements were:
(a) June 1, 1952, executed by Nan Han-chen, chairman of CITPC and two
Japanese Diet members, Tomi Koora and Kei Hoashi. The agreement was for
one year with a target of £60,000,000 two-way trade; however, only
$15,510,000 was achieved.
(b) October 29, 1953, executed by CITPC and the Japanese trade delegation. This
agreement was also for one year with a target of £60,000,000 two-way trade;
however, only $59,870,800 was achieved.
(c) May 4, 1955, 55 Agreements of the People's Republic of China [C.C.J.C.] 36
(1968), executed by the CITPC, Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, Dietmen's League for the Promotion of Trade between Japan
and China, and the Japan-China Trade Representative Group. The agreement
was for two years, and in addition to trade, provided for the holding of trade
exihibitions in the P.R.C. and Japan. In 1956, trade between the P.R.C. and
Japan expanded to $150,990,000. Japan exported primarily iron and steel,
chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals, and imported primarily salt,
coal, magnesia, and hides.
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China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CITPC)
and trade missions representing Japanese trade organizations.
The Korean War, however, inhibited the growth of two-way trade,
and the Nagasaki "flag incident" in 1958 caused a suspension of
trade until 1960. 35
Trade resumed in August of 1960 based upon the "three
political principles" and "three principles of trade" stipulated by
the late Premier Chou En-lai. Based upon his belief in the inseparability of politics and trade, Premier Chou stated that the
P.R.C would not conduct business with Japanese companies which
did not support the following political principles: (1) terminating
any hostile attitude by Japan towards the P.R.C.; (2) not engaging
in the scheme to establish two Chinas; and (3) not impeding the
process of normalization of relations between the P.R.C. and
Japan. 36 The principles of trade included: (1) all agreements were
to be government level agreements; (2) individual transactions
could be concluded on a friendly private basis; and (3) trade in
selected commodities, (for example, lacquer and sweet chestnuts)
July 1957-March 1958, the following agreements were executed:
import (to Japan) agreement relating to magnesia; 120,000
July, 1957
metric tons.
import (to Japan) agreement relating to salt; 1,000,000
August, 1957
metric tons.
export (to P.R.C.) agreement relating to chemical fertilizers;
December, 1957
amonium sulfate (400,000 metric tons); and urea (30,000
metric tons).
import (to Japan) agreement relating to rice; 50,000 metric
tons.
export (to P.R.C.) relating to urea; 20,000 metric tons.
February, 1958
five year barter agreement relating to iron and copper.
import (to Japan) agreement relating to rice; 30,000 metric
March, 1958
tons.
import (to Japan) agreement relating to soybeans; 265,000
metric tons per year.
Y. Miwa, Sino-Japanese Trade Relations After World War II, 1945-1962, at 14-32 (May 1974,
preliminary draft) (quoted with permission of the author); and H. HIRAI, NI-CHU BOEKI NO
KISOCHISHIKI (BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN-CHINA TRADE) 183-88, 307-14 (1971).
35. On May 2, 1958, a P.R.C. flag at the site of a P.R.C. trade exhibition in Nagasaki
was torn down by a Japanese youth. The police refused to prosecute and the Japanese
government declined to apologize to the P.R.C. As a result, the P.R.C. announced a suspension of trade with Japan and cancelled all outstanding contracts. However, underlying this
incident was Prime Minister Kishi's cabinet's statement concerning the fourth SinoJ apanese trade agreement of March 1958. This statement clarified that expansion of
P.R.C.-Japan trade was based upon the non-recognition of the P.R.C. Government by
Japan. Miwa, supra note 34, at 38-39.
36. NI-CHO' BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 8.
(d)
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would be encouraged in order to support small enterprises. 37 The
P.R.C. subsequently conceded on the first trade principle, but the
absence of relations between the two countries and the restrictions later imposed by the Coordinating Committee for Export
Control (COCOM) 38 inhibited the growth of two-way trade.
Pursuant to these political and trade principles, the concept
of friendship trade developed, and, thereafter, in 1962, memorandum trade began. 39 Under friendship trade only those trading companies which accepted the above stated principles and which
belonged to one of the trade promotion organizations were allowed
to do business with the P.R.C. 40 All companies which desired to
conduct business with the P.R.C. were obliged to use the services
of this select group of trading companies. Major Japanese trading
companies established subsidiaries which qualified as friendly
trading companies, and by 1971 the number of these subsidiaries
had expanded to 238. 41
The major functions of the friendly trading companies were
to: (1) hold trade fairs in the respective countries; (2) dispatch
trade and economic representative delegations; (3) promote the exchange of technology; and (4) work for the establishment of correspondent relations between Japanese and P.R.C. banks. 42 Three
documents, the Agreement Concerning Promotion of Friendly
Trade Between the Japanese and Chinese Peoples (1967), the
Record of Discussions (1968), and the Joint Communique Between
the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade
and Six Associations and the China Committee for the Promotion
37. Id. Trade was renewed on the basis that Japanese companies ordering Chinese
products were "direct partners" and middlemen such as trading firms did not make profit.
JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION (JETRO), How To APPROACH THE
CHINA MARKET 75 (1972).
38. Tozdi boeki no arikata COCOM-kinyu-list o-haba-kanwa-saku fukumu (The
Method of East-West Trade: COCOM Prohibited Export List Eased), Nipponkogyoshimbun
(Japan Industrial Newspaper), Oct. 17, 1978, at 1.
39. In 1961, the Japanese government discarded the principle of dealing with the
P.R.C. only under a barter system, and shortly thereafter removed many export items from
the COCOM list. Imports from the P.R.C. were subject to Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI) approval. In 1962, deferred payments from the P.R.C. for steel and
chemical fertilizers were approved. Japan Eximbank loan credits were also made available,
but this was cancelled one year later. Miwa, supra note 34, at 65-67; and NI-CHU BOEKI KISOCHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 197.
40. Primarily, those companies belonged to the Japan Association for the Promotion
of International Trade.
41. NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 188-189.
42. Id. at 184.
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of International Trade (1970) enumerated in detail the above principles of friendship trade and the direction in which that trade was
to proceed. 43
As a supplement to friendship trade, a memorandum trade
agreement (Takahashi-Liao Agreement) was initialed on November 9, 1962 with a five-year term, calling for an annual two-way
trade totaling US$100 million over five years. Pursuant to this
agreement, liaison offices were established in Peking and Tokyo,
manufacturers were divided into groups according to products imported or exported, and the selection of friendly Japanese trading
companies was liberalized. 44 This agreement was renewed in 1967,
and until the signing of the Japan-China Trade Agreement in 1974
on a governmental level, this agreement served as a second basis
of trade between the two countries. 45
Under the memorandum trade agreements, Japanese makers
and users formed the Japan-China General Trade Liaison Conference. Individual companies signed "memorandum trade"
agreements for such products as plant exports, which in general
had five year deferred-payment provisions, and for exports of
chemical fertilizers, steel materials, agricultural products, and
machines, each of which included provisions for payment from one
to two years after acceptance of delivery .46 However, in 1965, the
Satoh Government in Japan, under pressure from the U.S. government, restricted the use of deferred payment provisions. 47
Prior to 1972, individual contracts between P.R.C. and
Japanese companies reflected the non-governmental nature of
P.R.C.-Japan relations. Contracts contained payment, arbitration,
and other clauses in favor of the Chinese party. These clauses suggest the absence of formal legal sanctions for enforcement. A
typical form purchase agreement drafted by the P .R.C. party is
discussed in section IV.

B.

Post-1972 Structural Framework and Contrasts in U.S.P.R. C. Government Agreements
The success of Japan in trading with the P.R.C. subsequent to

43. Id. at 184-85.
44. Miwa, supra note 34, at 65.
45. NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 186; and JETRO, THE JAPANESE
PERSPECTIVE ON CHINA'S OPENING ECONOMY 182 (1979).
46. NI-CHU BOEKI KISO-CHISHIKI, supra note 34, at 186.
47. Id. at 187.
48. Nippon-koku to chiika-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no boeki ni kansuru kyotei,
supra note 2.
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the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972 is partially attributable to the structural support framework at the governmental, quasi-governmental, and private levels. Important government level agreements are: the Japan-P.R.C. Agreement Concerning Trade (1974), 48 the Japan-P.R.C. Agreement Concerning The
Protection of Trademarks (1978), 49 and the direct loan from Japan
to the P .R.C. 50 The quasi-governmental agreement is the untied
Japan Eximbank Loan. 51 There are two private level agreements,
the Long Term Trade Agreement, 52 and a loan agreement between
thirty-one Japanese banks and the P.R.C. 53 These agreements are
substantially different from comparable United States-Japan
agreements as they reflect the Japanese and Chinese preference
for friendly discussion and compromise to settle disputes.
The Trade and Trademark Agreements 54 merely outline
general principles, leaving details to more specific governmental
arrangement and private agreements. Each provision in the Trade
and Trademark Agreements is simply drafted, in contrast to the
content of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (United States-Japan Treaty) 55 which is detailed. The
latter reflects the United States attitude that it is imperative to
define every term and precisely draft an instrument so as to clearly specify each party's rights and obligations. The Trade Agree49. Nippon-koku to chiika-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no shohyo no hogo ni kansuru
kyotei, supra note 2, at 2171-163-4 to 2171-163-5; and Y. KOBAYASHI AND H. GOTO, NI-CHU
SHOHYO HOGO KY()TEI: KAISETSU (JAPAN-CHINA AGREEMENT ON PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS:
AN EXPLANATION) (1978).
50. NICCHUKEIZAIKYOKAI (JAPAN-CHINA ASSOCIATION ON ECONOMY & TRADE), 79-12
SHIRYO: NI-CHU KEIZAI 5 (MATERIALS ON JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMY) (1979).
51. Tai-chu-yiishi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu-saidai no ken-an katazuku kam-min tomo
chugoku daihyo-dan to choin e (Financing Negotiations with China Are Concluded: JapanChina's Largest Pending Questions Are Settled: Officials and Private Companies and
China's Negotiation Team Sign), Nihonkeizaishimbun (Japan Economic Times) May 15,
1979, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Nikkei].
52. The initial agreement, private in nature, was signed in February, 1978. Shindankai no ni-chu kyoryoku; jo (A New Stage in Japan-China Cooperation; Part/), Nikkei,
Dec. 2, 1979, at 1.
53. Tai-chu-yushi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu-saidai no kenan katazuku kam-min tomo
chugoku daihyo-dan to chain e, Nikkei, supra note 51.
54. Nippon-koku to chuka-jimmin-kyowa-koku to no aida no shohyo no hogo ni kansuru
kyotei, supra note 49. The Trademark Agreement provides for most favored treatment to
legal or natural persons of either country who desire to register trademarks or other
rights in either country. As with the Trade Agreement, the initial period is three years,
and, thereafter, continues automatically unless terminated by thirty days' prior notice by
either party.
55. U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3.
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ment consists of ten articles, in contrast to twenty-five articles in
the United States-Japan Treaty.
The preamble of the Trade Agreement affirms respect for the
private trade system existing prior to 1972, and proceeds to
declare the basing of trade on the principle of mutual equality and
friendship. 56 The U.S.-Japan Treaty preamble, on the other hand,
states the desire to encourage closer economic and cultural relations and to promote mutually advantageous commercial intercourse, and is based upon unconditionally according national and
most favored nation treatment. 57
The most prominent contrast between the two treaties is in
the clauses dealing with dispute resolution. In the Trade Agreement, parties are encouraged to settle disputes by friendly discussion.58 In cases where no settlement is reached, provisions in individual commercial agreements shall be given effect. Each country shall accord an arbitration judgment effect where requested in
accordance with domestic law. Further, each party is encouraged
to use the arbitration bodies of each country .59
The Trade Agreement dispute settlement provisions clearly
demonstrate Japanese and Chinese preference for friendly discussion to settle issues. Even if the parties resort to arbitration, the
enforcement of an arbitration tribunal's award is dependent upon
the domestic law of each country. 60 This limitation serves to
discourage each party from resorting to arbitration. Also, the
Trade Agreement states that if arbitration is not stipulated in a
commercial agreement between two companies, the contract parties may bind themselves to a separate arbitration agreement. 61
This provision alludes to the practice of excluding an arbitration
provision in Japanese domestic agreements. Finally, the Trade
Agreement provides for a mixed commission composed of the
members of each government to deal with any problems in the execution of this agreement or with any trade problems in general. 62
Again, this provision indicates the Japanese and Chinese
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, preamble.
U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3, preamble.
Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 8(1).
Id., article 8(3).
Id., article 8(4).
Id., article 8(2).
Id., article 9.
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preference for constant discussion to deal with ongoing trade problems.
The U .S.-J a pan Treaty provides two methods for dispute
resolution, litigation and arbitration. 63 Court decisions are enforceable in accordance with the principle of equal access to the
courts in each country by the aggrieved parties. 64 Arbitration
awards rendered outside the United States are enforceable to the
"same measure of recognition as awards rendered in other States
[of the United States]." 65
The U .S.-J a pan Treaty dispute settlement provisions
underline the U.S. legal principles of comity and the opportunity
to appear. It is also notable that no provision provides for the settlement of disputes by friendly discussion or negotiation prior to
formal legal procedures. However, parties will inevitably attempt
to negotiate a settlement before invoking arbitration or litigating.
The difference is that the U.S. side will inevitably bring an attorney to such negotiations, whereas in Japanese-Chinese
disputes, an attorney is rarely brought into dispute settlement
discussions.
Most-favored-nation treatment is another area where the contrast between the two treaties is significant. Articles of the Trade
Agreement provide for most-favored-nation treatment covering
taxes or duties on import and export articles. 66 Tax exemptions
and duty exemptions are provided for goods, catalogues, articles
used for demonstration or experimental purposes, articles
displayed in trade fairs or exhibitions, tools used in assembling
work or equipment installation, containers used in export or import, and articles in transit through either of the signatory parties
to third countries. 67
In contrast, the U.S.-Japan Treaty provides for both national
and most-favored-nation treatment to a much greater scope. A
total of six articles accord either national or most-favored-nation
treatment. National treatment is accorded in a wide variety of circumstances. This treatment includes application of laws and
regulations, 68 access to courts and administrative tribunals, 69 pro63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3, article IV(2).
Id.
Id.
Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 1.
Id., article 2.
U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3, article III.
Id., article IV.
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tection of leased or owned property, 70 equal handling of products
regarding internal taxation, sale, and distribution, 11 and carrying
of products by vessels. 72 Most-favored-nation treatment is accorded for access to courts and administrative tribunals, 73 protection of
leased or owned property ,74 entry and departure from the territories of the other party for commercial travelers, 75 application
of customs duties on arriving and exported products, 76 and taxation, sales, and distribution conditions for products. 77
Other provisions in the Trade Agreement are also drafted as
principles with the single exception of the clause dealing with currencies of settlement. 78 For example, transaction prices between
the two countries are to be based upon international market
prices. 79 Additional provisions note that each country is bound to
energetically endeavor to promote the flow of industrial
technology ,80 and, to the greatest extent possible, encourage the
holding of trade exhibitions in each country. 81
The U .S.-J a pan Treaty specifically addresses a number of
commercial transaction issues. These issues include the level of
exchange restrictions on payments, remittances, and transfers of
funds or financial instruments, 82 exchange rate quotations for
private commercial agreements, 83 and the absence of restrictions
on the import or export of products. 84 The rejection of double taxation is also dealt with at length in the U .S.-J a pan Treaty 85 as well
as in a separate U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty. 86 No such treaty is in force
Id., article VI.
Id., article XI.
Id., article XIX.
Id., article IV.
Id., article VI.
Id., article XIII.
Id., article XIV.
Id., article XVI.
Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 4(2).
Id., article 5.
Id., article 6.
Id., article 7.
U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 3.
Id., article XII.
Id., article XIV.
Id., article XI.
86. Shotoku ni tai suru sozei ni kansuru nijyukazei no kaihi oyobi datsuzei no boshi no
tame no nipponkoku to amerika-ga sshu-koku to no aida no joyaku (Treaty between Japan
and U.S. on Income Tax with Regard to the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Tax Delinquency), 94 GENKO-HOKI SORAN (ALL EXISTING LAWS AND REGULATIONS) 2187-230 to 2188 (June
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

23, 1972).
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between Japan and the P.R.C. Rather, provisions of the Trade
Agreement address this issue. 87
The direct Japan-P.R.C. government loan, the Japan Eximbank loan, the Long Term Trade Agreement, and the private bank
loan agreement, provide additional structural support for
Japan-P.R.C. trade. The direct Japan to P.R.C. government loan
agreement was executed on December 7, 1979, during Prime
Minister Ohira's visit to the P.R.C. The loan, in the amount of ¥50
billion (@1!250 = $1, US$200 million), is at the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) lowest interest rate guideline and varies in duration according to each of
six targeted projects. 88 These projects are:
(1) Shijiusuo gang jianshe (Shijiusuo harbor construction)
(Shantung Province). This project covers the construction of harbor berths for ships carrying coal and iron ore. The berths will
be used to facilitate shipment of Chinese coal overseas and to accept iron ore from Australia to supply five ironworks in the Peking vicinity. Construction time is estimated at three years. Of a
total project cost of US$322 million, US$220 million will be funded by the loan;
(2) Railway construction between Shijiusuo and Yanzhou
(Shantung Province). This project involves the construction of a
300-kilometer, one-track line for diesel locomotives in order to
transport raw coal from Yanzhou to the port of Shijiusuo and to
transport iron ore and general coal shipment inland. Construction time is estimated at three years. Of a total US$296 million
cost, funds from the loan will total US$165 million;
(3) Railway construction between Peking and Langwopu.
This project includes the construction of a 150-kilometer double
track for electric trains. This line will primarily be used to
transport coal but will also be incorporated into a trunk line
originating in Harbin. The construction period is estimated at
three years. Of a total cost of US$642 million, US$375 million will
be provided from the loan funds;
(4) Construction and upgrading of the Jingguang railway
line between Guangzhou and Hengyang (Guangdong and Hebei
Provinces). The Japan Railroad Construction Corporation will
dispatch engineers to assist in the construction of tunnels along
87. Japan-P.R.C. Trade Agreement, supra note 2, article 3.
88. NICCHUKEIZAIKYOKAI (JAPAN-CHINA ASSOCIATION ON ECONOMY &
SHIRYO: NI-CHU KEIZAI (MATERIALS ON JAPAN-CHINA ECONOMY) 1-5 (1979).
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this line. The line is to be a double track and used for the exchange of general commodities between the interior and the
South of the P.R.C. The construction period of this line is
estimated to be four years at a total cost of US$1.87 billion.
US$106 million of the loan funds will be applied to this project;
(5) Qinhuangdao harbor expansion (Hebei Province). This
project consists of the construction of two berths for 50,000 ton
class ships. Upon the completion of the project in three years,
the harbor will have an annual handling capacity of 300 million
tons. Of a total cost of US$161 million, US$104 million will be
provided by funds from this loan;
(6) Wuqiangxi water electric works (Hunan Province). This
project involves building a dam on the Ruanshui River to
generate electricity, prevent flooding, and facilitate irrigation
and water transport. The power generating capability of the
dam is estimated at an annual 7.1 billion kilowatts. The electricity generated will be transmitted to Wuhan and to tin, lead, zinc,
and other non-ferrous metalworks in the Wuhan area. In 1979,
18,000 workers were transported to the project site to begin construction in 1980. Construction is expected to take six years at a
total cost of US$803 million with US$330 million to be funded
from this loan;
(7) Japan-China People's Friendship Memorial Hospital (Beijing). This 1000-bed capacity hospital is scheduled for completion
in two years. The Japan Ministry of Health has provided
technical assistance to the P.R.C. physicians' group which will
staff the hospital. Of a total cost of US$140 million, US$61 million
will be provided as a straight grant.

The Japan Eximbank loan agreement ratified on May 15, 1979
provides for the equivalent of US$2 billion in Japanese yen for
resource development. In addition to this agreement, thirty-one
private banks have earmarked US$2 billion in long-term funds and
US$6 billion in short-term funds, primarily to finance deferred
payments for plant exports to China. The Eximbank terms include
a 6.25% per annum interest rate, with the financing period for individual projects to be decided on an individual project basis. 89 An
average ten-year loan period is predicted by Eximbank sources. 90
Although the loan is untied, Japanese financial and industrial
89. Tai-chu-yushi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu-saidai no kenan katazuku kam-min tomo
chugoku daihyo-dan to choin e, Nikkei, supra note 51.
90. Id.
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circles have predicted that private bank loans, which are to be
tied, will be used to partially 'finance targeted projects of the
Eximbank loan. In addition, it is speculated that the Japanese will
use tied loans in conjunction with demonstration techniques and
after-sales servicing to give Japanese industrial concerns a competitive advantage over foreign firms in securing natural resource
development project orders. 91
The Long Term Trade Agreement, 92 as revised in March,
1979, extended the original term from 1985 to 1990 and increased
the goal of two-way trade from US$10 billion to a range of
US$20-$30 billion. The terms of the agreement include a continued
emphasis on deferred payments, denominated one-half in Japanese
yen and one-half in U.S. dollars, for plant exports from Japan to
the P.R.C., and interest rate payments at the OECD guideline.
The terms of the private banks' loan package provide for: (1)
an annual interest rate of 0.5% above the Eurodollar rate, for
long-term funds of US$2 billion; and (2) an annual interest rate of
0.25% above the Eurodollar rate, for short-term funds of US$6
billion. 93
In addition to the above structural framework for two-way
trade, Japanese-Chinese enterprise group joint projects are currently in the planning process. These projects include a joint venture for insurance, 94 a joint project for the insurance of Chinese
central government bonds and Fukien Province bonds in interna91. See Kaihatsu-sogaku ju-oku dolu: ni-chu-sekiyu-kaihatsu kyo choin: yu-gin shikin o
shiyo, nippon hambun hikitori (Development Amount of $1 Billion: Japan-China Oil
Development Agreement Signed Today: Using Eximbank Funds, Japan Obtained One-half
of Oil Production), Nikkei, Dec. 7, 1979, at 1.
92. The revised agreement was drafted and executed by the Japan-China Long-Term
Trade Consultative Commission (P.R.C.) and the Yoshihiro Inayama Japan-China LongTerm Trade Consultative Commission (Japan). NICCHUKEIZAIKYOKAI (JAPAN-CHINA ASSOCIATION ON ECONOMY & TRADE) 1979-5 SHIRYO: NI-CHU KEIZAI (MATERIALS ON JAPAN-CHINA
ECONOMY) 5 (1979).
93. Tai-chu-yushi-kosho ga ketchaku: ni-chu saidai no kenan katazuku kam-min tomo
chugoku daihyo-dan to choin e, Nikkei, supra note 51.
94. Types of insurance will be, (1) casualty insurance on freight shipped in importexport transactions as a supplement to marine insurance, (2) ship insurance on vessels used
to transport goods/plants and on vessels used in oil exploration, (3) assembly insurance
covering materials used in plant construction, and (4) construction insurance on the construction of factories and offices in the P.R.C. Ni-chu-kyodo-hoken-kyotei teiketsu e: hikiuke

seppan de, choki- torikime anken taisho (Japan-China Joint Insurance Agreement Progresses Towards Conclusion: Responsibility to be Divided 50/50: Object is Long Term
Agreements), Nikkei, Jan. 16, 1980, at 1; and interview with the Casualty Insurance
Association, Tokyo, Japan, Jan. 22, 1980.
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tional financial markets, 95 and a joint venture for the leasing of
heavy equipment rented in Japan to Chinese industrial concerns. 96

IV.

COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS

A.

Forms of Trade and Problem Areas

"Diversified trade'' between Japan and the P.R.C. includes
processing, assembly arrangements (including licensing
agreements), compensation trade method, and joint ventures, in
addition to plant export and purchase-sales agreements. These
forms of trade are not unique to Japan-P.R.C. trade and are also
employed regularly in Japan-Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) trade. 97
Processing (itaku kako [Japanese], lailiaojiagong [Chinese]) involves the import of materials or samples from abroad to the
P.R.C. The Chinese manufacture or produce finished goods and
charge the Japanese supplier a processing fee for the manufacture.98 Usually a portion of the raw materials is furnished from
within the P.R.C. 99
Assembly arrangements (nockdown [Japanese], laijianzhuangbei [Chinese]) involve the supply by Japanese companies of
samples and equipment to P.R.C. enterprises. At present,
Japanese companies in the heavy machinery, electrical appliance,
and electronics industries have been the primary suppliers. The
P.R.C. company assembles the finished product using supplied
items, and, to date, has sold finished products chiefly in the P.R.C.
Where a Japanese company has not supplied equipment, the
95. Chugoku: kokusai-shijo de shikin-chotatsu e: yen-date-sai o dashin: shoken ni-sha,
sangatsu ho-chii-shi kyogi (China: To Seek Funds in the International Market: Inquiry as to
Yen Denominated Securities: Two Securities Companies to Visit China in March for
Discussions), Nikkei, Jan. 26, 1980, at 1.
96. Pekin de lease jigyo: oriento lease goben kaisha setsuritsu e (Leasing Enterprise
in Peking: Oriental Lease to Establish a Joint Venture Company), Nikkei, Jan. 31, 1980, at
3.
97. NICCHUBOEKISOKUSHINKAI (JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE), NI-CHU KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYOKA-BOEKI (DIVERSIFIED TRADE IN JAPANCHINA ECONOMIC COOPERATION) 4, (Mar. 1980).
98. Cohen and Nee point out that the Chinese differentiate between lailiaojiagong,
the import of raw materials and packaging from abroad for processing and laiyangjiagong,
the import of samples for processing based upon which the Chinese supply raw materials
and manufactured goods. Cohen and Nee, China: All About Compensation Trade, Part/,
The Asian Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1979, at 4.
99. NI-CHlJ KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYOKA-BOEKI. supra note 97, at 5.
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P.R.C. enterprise charges the company an assembly fee. Where
equipment has been supplied, the P.R.C. discounts the assembly
fee and credits to the Japanese side the portion of the full fee not
charged against the installment payments due for the price of the
equipment. 100
In compensation trade (hosh6-b6eki [Japanese], bushang
maoyi [Chinese]) the Japanese side supplies equipment and essential materials to a Chinese enterprise for mining, agricultural,
forestry, domestication, or light industry development. Chinese
enterprises pay for supplied equipment and materials with the
production from these enterprises or with products from different
industries. There are two levels of production-sharing: (1) largescale national projects such as oil and coal development which are
based on the Japan-China Long-Term Trade Agreement; 101 and (2)
local level (usually provincial level) projects which are small to
medium in scale and are not based on any trade agreement. 102
Payments in production by the Chinese are at a set price for a
fixed period. In contrast, payment provisions in each processing
agreement have been negotiated on a case-by-case basis. If the
Japanese side is displeased with the quality of goods produced by
the P.R.C. enterprise, renegotiations will be held on the processing fees stipulated within the agreement. As noted above,
Japanese businessmen believe that a change in circumstances
justifies a renegotiation of prices stipulated in a contract. Chinese
enterprise management has also been willing to renegotiate prices
for any processed articles which the Japanese side is reluctant to
accept. 103 In light of this renegotiation practice, it would be prudent to draft an automatic price readjustment clause in this type
of agreement. This clause would provide for mutual discussions on
the readjustment of price in the event processed goods fall below
a certain level of quality.
The Japanese government has published a set of guidelines
100. Id.
101. Shin-dankai no ni-chii kyoryoku; jo, supra note 52.
102. Id.
103. In one case, a Japanese purchaser ordered matching blue jeans and denim jackets
from a P.R.C. seller, supplying manufacturing specifications. Upon inspection after arrival
in Japan, the Japanese purchaser discovered that the blue jeans and denim jackets were different shades of blue. The P.R.C. seller agreed after prolonged negotiations to lower the
price of the items. Interview with H. Hirai, Director and Editor, Japan Association for the
Promotion of International Trade, Tokyo, Japan, Feb. 23, 1980.
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for the handling of these specific trade forms. 104 In the productionsharing method, resource development in the form of large-scale
national projects will be recognized. This recognition stems from
the Japanese government's policy to secure a stable oil and coal
import supply from the P.R.C.
Other forms of trade will be dealt with on a case-by-case
basis. However, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
will not approve production-sharing agreements involving the sale
of equipment to be paid for by the Chinese side in manufactured
goods. 105
In processing trade, those goods which are not "notably competitive" with domestic goods will be approved on the same basis
as is used with goods originating from other countries. This
qualification demonstrates the favorable treatment which the
Japanese government accords Chinese products. Assembly arrangements and joint ventures in Japan between a Japanese and a
P.R.C. enterprise will be handled in the same manner as is
presently in force. 106
There are also numerous pricing and financing problems in
diversified trade. In compensation trade, the Chinese enterprise is
104. Tai-chu boeki suishin e seifu hoshin: shigen wa seisanbutsu bunyo: kyusho-hoshiki
wa gensoku mitomezu (Government Policy is to Encourage Trade With China: Natural
Resources to be Exchanged for Production: Production Sharing Method Will Not Be
Recognized), Nikkei, Nov. 30, 1979, at 1.
105. Id.; But see NI-CHU KEIZAI KORYU NI OKERU TAYO-KA-BOEKI, supra, note 97, at 23,
which states that the Nikkei, Nov. 30, 1979 article is incorrect in reporting the nonrecognition of the production sharing method; rather, MIT! does not recognize a barter
system of trade without exchange rate calculations.
106. Any joint venture agreement between a Japanese corporation and foreign enterprise involving the establishment of a new company and new shares in a foreign country
must be approved by the Ministry of Finance pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Law,
Foreign Exchange Regulation, Article 14. If the joint venture is to be established in Japan,
approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Finance and other concerned ministries pursuant to the Foreign Investment Law, Article 11. As of December 18, 1980, the Foreign Investment Law will no longer be in effect. However, those intending to establish a joint venture in Japan will still be required to report the contents of the agreement for notification
purposes to the Ministry of Finance. See Seki, Gaikoku-kawase oyobi gaikoku-boeki kanri-ho
no kaisei ni tsuite: jo; ge (Regarding the Revision of the Foreign Exchange Law, I, II), Nos.
860 and 861 Shoji-homu (March 1980).
Those Japanese corporations intending to engage in processing trade must receive approval from MIT! pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Law, Export Trade Control Regulation, article 2-1, or article 1-1-2 and Import Trade Control Regulations, article 8-1-2.
Those Japanese corporations intending to dispatch technology to the P.R.C. under a
license agreement (including compensation trade) must obtain approval from MIT! pursuant
to the Foreign Exchange Law, Foreign Exchange Regulation, article 17-1-2.
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contractually obliged to remit a fixed quantity of manufactured
goods within a set time period to the Japanese party. In processing, however, the possibility exists that a dispute may arise as to
processing fees or the price at which manufactured goods are sold
to the Japanese enterprise which supplied the materials or parts
for processing. In addition, if the manufactured goods are to be
sold in Japan, the currency in which payment is made may become
problematic.
From the Japanese side, itis essential that P.R.C. labor costs
remain competitive and that prices change in accordance with
market conditions in Japan. From the Chinese side it may be
argued that the availability of higher retail market prices outside
Japan should allow the P.R.C. enterprise to raise the processing
fee charged to the Japanese party. To date, Japanese corporations
have offered extensive technological training at low fees, including quality control training, as a lever in pricing negotiations
with P.R.C. enterprises.
Letter-of-credit (L/C) financing of individual commercial transactions is subject to the requirement under Japanese law that
separate L/C's be open for export and import. When exporting
materials to be processed, for example, Japanese enterprises are
required to have the Chinese side pay for raw materials with an
L/C. When importing the processed goods from the P.R.C., the
Japanese enterprise is required to establish an L/C in favor of the
P.R.C. seller. 107 These two requirements complicate the use of an
L/C to finance trade.
To overcome this problem, the following arrangement is
employed. When exporting materials to the P.R.C., the Japanese
side receives an L/C payable at sight on a certain date usually set
after expected delivery of the processed goods from the P.R.C.
Upon receiving the processed goods, the Japanese side pays with
an L/C payable on demand. As the price of the processed goods exceeds the price of materials, the balance in favor of the P.R.C.
enterprise is then remitted to the Bank of China. 108
In the case of compensation trade, the long term between investment of equipment and production from a Chinese factory
necessitates the use of financing. Several methods are currently
107. NI-CHU KEIZAI
108. Id. at 19.

KORYU NI OKERU TAYOKA-BOEKI.
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used. In the most commonly used method, a Japanese supplier will
obtain a supplier's credit from a Japanese bank. The Bank of
China will then remit payment to the Japanese bank. This transfer
of funds from China to Japan will then be offset by a loan from the
Japanese bank to the Bank of China.

B.

Contractual Provisions in Japan-P.R. C. Private Commercial
Agreements

This section focuses on the differences among Japan-P.R.C.,
Japan-U.S., and Japan-third world private commercial agreements. In particular, provisions from a form purchase contract
drafted by the Chinese buyer 109 and J apan-P .R.C. licensing
agreements 110 are compared with Japan-U.S. and Japan-third
world sales and licensing agreements. 111
Arbitration provisions yield the most striking difference between Japan-P.R.C., Japan-U.S. and Japan-third world commercial
agreements. In the Japan-P.R.C. sales and licensing agreements,
the first sentence of the arbitration clause provides that, "all
disputes which arise with relation to this contract or with the execution hereof, shall be solved by the parties through consultation
with each other ." 112 This wording reflects Japanese and Chinese
preferences for reaching a compromise solution that will avoid the
loss of face and the expense involved in proceeding to open
dispute in the form of arbitration.
The place of arbitration is specified as the place of the party
to whom the demand for arbitration has been addressed. If the arbitration is to take place in the P.R.C., the procedure is governed
by the arbitration rules and procedures of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the China Counsel for the Promotion of
International Trade. If the arbitration is to take place in Japan,
the rules and procedures of the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association are applied.
109. These contract provisions are from a form purchase contract used by China
Metals & Mining Import-Export Company reprinted and discussed in Ni-chu boeki ni okeru
'keiyakusho ': keiyakusho kisai-rei no ken to ('Contracts' in Japan-China Trade; Examination
of Contract Provisions), NBL, No. 8 at 36-39 (Jan. 15, 1972).
110. NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 29, and interviews with C. Kaneda, JapanChina Friendship Association, and H. Hirai, supra note 103.
111. Examples of U.S.-Japan sales and licensing agreements and Japan-third world
licensing agreements are drawn from the authors' work product.
112. NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note l, at 49.
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An interesting problem arises, however, in the case of crossclaims. In one case, a Chinese enterprise served a demand for arbitration on a Japanese corporation. Under the above clause, arbitration was to be held in Japan. The Japanese party crossclaimed, and the Chinese party asserted that the cross-claims
must be heard in the P.R.C. The parties finally agreed, after prolonged negotiations, on hearing the whole case in Japan. 113
Arbitrators are not limited to the names in the register of the
Japanese or Chinese association. A third-country national may be
chosen as an arbitrator with the agreement of both parties.
The arbitration decision is final and binding upon both parties. However, each association is obliged to obtain the approval of
its respective national government to give full force and effect to
the decision. Thus, in theory, if one government did not approve of
the arbitration decision, the other party to the agreement would
be unable to enforce the arbitration award. This possibility serves
to pressure the parties into reaching agreement through friendly
discussions.
In contrast, a Japan-U.S. agreement rarely places an obligation on the parties to engage in friendly discussions to reach a
compromise solution before proceeding to arbitration. Japan-U.S.
sales and licensing agreements usually provide for the settlement
of disputes in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Trade Arbitration
Agreement of September 16, 1952, 114 or with the rules of the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association. Under the U.S.-Japan Arbitration Agreement, the site of arbitration is the place of the party
to whom the notice for arbitration has been addressed. Arbitration
decisions are also binding subject to enforcement in the courts of
either country.
Japan-third world licensing agreements usually provide for
arbitration in Tokyo under the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. In those agreements where the licensee's
government requires application of its own laws, the Japanese
licensor usually inserts a provision providing for arbitration in accordance with the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
Force majeure clauses in Japan-P.R.C. sales and licensing
113. Interview with M. F. Higgins, attorney at law, Graham & James, Tokyo, Japan,
Apr. 19, 1980.
114. Arbitration Agreement, supra note 5.
115. Ni-chu boeki ni okeru 'keiyakusho:' keiyakusho kisai-re~ supra note 109, at 37.
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agreements are also different from their counterparts in
Japan-U.S. agreements. Prior to the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Japan and China in 1972, only war and natural
phenomena were included in force majeure clauses. 115 In post-1972
provisions, strikes, lockouts, government orders, and other force
majeure conditions have been added. 116 In the case of Japanese exports to the P.R.C., delay in arrival at the Chinese port of destination due to port congestion is not included within the scope of the
force majeure provision. 117
The sales agreement provides that if the force majeure condition continues for four weeks or more, the P .R.C. buyer may
unilaterally cancel the contract. This right is not specifically accorded to the Japanese seller in the wording of the provision. The
Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements provide that if the force majeure condition continues for more than ninety days, the parties
will engage in friendly discussions in order to promptly settle the
question of the continued effectiveness of the agreement. A
typical Japan-U.S. sales agreement, in contrast, lists a number of
force majeure conditions such as blockade, embargo, mobilization,
fire, flood, hurricane, typhoon, and landslide.
Other provisions of interest in the Japan-P.R.C. sales agreement include method of payment, shipment terms, inspection of
quality and quantity, warranty, and penalty for delayed performance.
L/C is the sole method of payment, and an L/C is to be initiated subsequent to the receipt, within twenty to thirty days
before shipment, of a cable from the Japanese seller which states
the prospective date of shipping. L/C's prior to 1972 were
established by the P.R.C. purchaser with the Bank of China and
were payable only at a friendly Japanese bank. Payment was effected in pounds sterling or French francs (usually the former) via
a bank with which both the Bank of China and the friendly
Japanese bank had a correspondent agreement.
At present, L/C settlement may be between the Bank of
China and any one of thirty-one Japanese banks with whom correspondent agreements have been concluded. 118 More than fifty
116. NI·CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note l, at 39-40.
117. Interview with H. Hirai, supra note 103.
118. NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 77, lists the thirty-one banks which have concluded correspondent agreements with the Bank of China.
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percent of the transactions are settled in U.S. dollars with the remainder being settled primarily -in Japanese yen or Chinese renminbi. Procedures for settlement are governed by the agreement
between Japan's foreign exchange banks and the Bank of China. 119
Prior to 1972, in cases where products to be sold were on the
CO COM list, Japanese sellers were required to send, in a telegram
to the Chinese buyer, the approval permit number issued by the
Japanese government. While the Japanese seller is still required
to telegraph a permit number issued by the Japanese Government
for items on the COCOM list, relaxation of COCOM restrictions
against the P.R.C. have rendered this requirement a formality in
most cases. 120
Inspection of quality and quantity of each shipment must be
performed at the port of origin by an inspector appointed by the
P .R.C. or the manufacturer. Final acceptance, however, is subject
to inspection at the port of destination by the P .R.C. Products Inspection Bureau. If the inspector discovers a defect, the buyer is
required to present a written claim to the Products Inspection
119.
of China
(1)
(2)

The settlement agreement between Japan's foreign exchange banks and the Bank
provides for:
currency to be used (presently at the buyer's option);
market price (based on the public announcements of the China Foreign Currency
Administrative Bureau);
(3)
settlement of accounts (settlement in yen account or renminbi account);
(4)
procurement of yen/renminbi (purchases of renminbi or yen by each side); and
(5)
disposition of balance after settlement (at any time yen/renminbi may be exchanged by banks into U.S. dollars, and remitting of money overseas will be
allowed).
With regard to future settlements, the above banks have agreed that:
(1)
if future settlement is to be in yen, same will be transacted at a Japanese bank; if
future settlement is to be in renminbi, same will be transacted at the Bank of
China;
(2)
future settlement in yen/renminbi is for a concrete transaction;
(3)
future settlement will be limited to six months;
(4)
in principle, settlement should take place within one month after the execution of
the contract;
(5)
it is possible to use future settlement for the export of the Japanese side,
together with a note; and
(6)
when future settlement is employed, the contract number, product name, and
amount will be reported.
NI-CHU BOEKI HIKKEI, supra note 1, at 74.
120. c·ocOM approval is still required for a number of items including aircraft and
computers. See Chugoku e YX yushutsu keikaku (Plan to Export the YX [Boeing 767] to
China), Nikkei, Aug. 27, 1979, at 1; and Hozan-seitetsujo-yo no densanki: COCOM ga yushutsu shonin: Hitachi nado yonsha de juroku-dai (Computer for Baoshan Ironworks: COCOM
Approves Export: Hitachi and Four Other Companies, 16 Computers), Nikkei, Dec. 21,
1978.
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Bureau within ninety days for transmission to the Japanese seller.
Thus, the significance of port-of-origin inspection is unclear in
terms of interpretation of the purchase agreement.
Warranty periods are from one to five years with the purchaser having the options of repair at no cost or partial or complete replacement by the seller at no charge. It is notable,
however, that no provision reserves to the P.R.C. purchaser the
right to terminate the agreement and demand damages if defective products frustrate the purpose of the contract. This long warranty period contrasts with the period stipulated in a Japan-U.S.
sales agreement. The latter usually specifies a one-year period.
Force majeure is the only condition under which delayed
arrival of products in the Chinese port of destination will avoid a
penalty assessment. For every two weeks of delayed arrival up to
a maximum of ten weeks, a penalty of 1% (a maximum total
amount of 5%) of the total contract price is assessed against the
seller. After ten weeks, the P.R.C. purchaser acquires the right to
terminate the contract. This penalty provision contrasts with
drafting in the Japan-U.S. sales agreement where no penalty for
late delivery is provided. The buyer only has the option to terminate the whole agreement.
There are a number of provisions in the Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements which are drafted differently from comparable
provisions in the Japan-U.S. and Japan-third world licensing
agreements. Those provisions include the preamble, technical
assistance, price and payment method, and inventions and improvements.
The preamble in Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements (P.R.C.
agreement) states that parties A and B, upon the conclusion of
friendly discussions, have concluded the following agreement.
Preambles in Japan-U.S. licensing agreements (U.S. agreement)
merely state that the agreement has been made on a certain date
between parties A and B. In the P.R.C. agreement preamble, the
parties are identified by name only, whereas in the U.S. agreement, the state of incorporation and business address are specified.
No "whereas" clauses are used in the P.R.C. agreement. This
follows the Japanese belief that "whereas" clauses perform no useful function. 121 In contrast, the U.S. agreement inevitably contains
121. Woodward and Matsuo, Drafting License Agreements in Japan and in the United
States, in PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 124, 125 (T.
Doi, W. Shattuck ed. 1977).
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"whereas" clauses. This reflects the belief in the United States
that "whereas" clauses are useful in the interpretation of a contract, especially where a merger clause is included in the instrument.122
Technical assistance clauses in the P.R.C. agreement are
wider in scope than comparable clauses in the U.S. agreement and
third world agreement. In the P .R.C. agreement technical
assistance usually takes the form of the dispatch of Japanese
technicians to the P .R.C. to engage in technical training for
manufacture, management techniques, safety, and quality control.
In addition, the Japanese side is obliged to guarantee that the supplied technology is the most recent of its kind. This requirement is
also reflected in Article 5 of the P.R.C. Law on Chinese and
Foreign Enterprises. 123 This article states that, "the technology or
equipment contributed by any foreign participant as investment
shall be truly advanced and appropriate to the P.R.C.'s needs." 124
Fees and training periods for the licensee's personnel are not
specified in the P.R.C. agreement. Rather, the parties agree to settle these items by friendly and mutual discussions.
The U.S. agreement limits technical assistance to the supply
of printed technical information subject to prices charged by the
licensor at the time of request. The Japan-third world agreement
(third world agreement) limits technical assistance to the supply of
printed technical information.
Training is provided for in a limited manner, in contrast to
the P.R.C. agreement. Trainees who are dispatched by the
licensee are limited to a small number per year and, for a limited
period only, receive training at the licensor's factory in Japan. The
licensee is required to pay a training fee as charged by the licensor. The licensor will dispatch technicians to licensee upon request
for a limited period of time.
122. A typical merger clause provides:
There are no verbal agreements, warranties, representations or understandings
affecting this Agreement, all previous agreements, or other negotiations,
representations and understandings between A and B are merged herein, and this
Agreement supersedes, cancels and annuls all contracts, undertakings or
agreements of prior dates relating to the subject matter of this Agreement.
123. Chu-gai-goshi-keiei-kigyo-ho (Law on Chinese and Foreign Enterprises), Article 5,
states in pertinent part that, "[t]he technology or equipment contributed by any foreign participant as investment shall be truly advanced and appropriate to China's need."
NIHONKOKUSAIBOEKISOKUSHINKYOKAI (JAPAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE), CHUGOKU KEIZAI-KANKEI HOREI-SHU (COLLECTION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF
CHINA CONCERNING ECONOMIC RELATIONS)

38-40 (1980).

124. Id.
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The payment method in the P.R.C. agreement is also different. Due to the difficulty of ascertaining the number of
manufactured units to be sold by the licensee in the P .R.C., payment consists of a lump sum for the know-how which is supplied
by the Japanese licensor. If the licensee exports manufactured
units in the future, royalties on these units are to be settled
through the friendly discussions and mutual agreement of the parties. The payment currency is divided between U.S. dollars and
Japanese yen.
In contrast, the U.S. and third world agreements limit payment to an initial payment, with a minimum royalty to be paid
semi-annually, and an additional set percentage royalty on
licensee's sales of licensed products. In addition, separate charges
are levied on the supply of technical information and training. The
Japanese licensor obliges U.S. and third world licensees to supply
records documenting sales for royalty purposes. The P .R.C. agreement does not address this matter.
In the P.R.C. agreement, clauses relating to inventions and
improvements by the licensee are also different from provisions in
the U.S. and third world agreements. The licensee is obliged to
notify the licensor of any inventions and improvements covering
the licensed products. However, the parties are to engage in
friendly discussion to agree on the registration of any patents outside the P.R.C. In addition, the parties are usually obliged to hold
conferences on a regular basis to exchange information concerning
inventions and improvements.
Finally, a number of provisions found in the U.S. and third
world agreements are absent in the P .R.C. agreement. These include sub-licensing rights, warranties of non-infringement on third
parties' patents, an assignment clause, and a governing law clause.
Other Japan-P.R.C. licensing agreements contain a governing law
clause specifying the laws of both the P.R.C. and Japan. The
absence of either a governing law clause or a governing law clause
referring to two governing laws points to the emphasis which the
Japanese and Chinese parties place on the arbitration clause and
on the obligation to engage in friendly discussions.

V.

CONCLUSION

Emphasis on social harmony is a central theme in Chinese and
Japanese society. In the legal systems of both countries emphasis
is placed on the social obligations and the future relationship of
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the parties over rights and obligations as expressed within the
"four corners" of the written document. Thus, the Japanese and
Chinese prefer drafting bilateral commercial agreements with ambiguous wording, leaving a formulation of rights and obligations to
the social compact of friendly discussion or mediation.
Whether Japanese corporations will, in the long run, be
benefited by this drafting approach depends upon the P .R.C.'s continued adherence to the policy of encouraging foreign investment.
Yet, in the P.R.C. and Japan, where maintaining mutual trust
outweighs rights and obligations, the Japan-P.R.C. model of commercial agreements is instructive to U .$. attorneys in their drafting approaches to U.S.-P.R.C. commercial agreements. If a U.S.
corporation is to successfully develop business relations with the
P.R.C., it is essential to emphasize mutual trust over rights and
obligations.
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VL APPENDIX
DOMESTIC JAPANESE KNOW-HOW LICENSING
AGREEMENT

(Stamp Tax)
A Company (hereinafter referred to as A) and B Company
(hereinafter referred to as B) have hereby agreed with regard to
the supply of A's manufacturing technology (hereinafter referred
to as know-how) as follows:

Article 1. Object
A agrees to the manufacture and sale by B of X machine
(hereinafter referred to as X) incorporating know-how.
Article 2. Obligation of Notice
2(1)
B shall inform A of the quantity of X which B manufactures on a case-by-case basis.
2(2)
B shall inform A in writing, in advance, of the identity
of purchaser, quantity of X sold, price for each order,
and delivery date for the sale of X, and shall follow A's
instructions.
Article 3. Royalty
3(1)
In consideration of the grant of know-how, B shall pay
to A __ percent ( % ) of the total sales of X as royalty.
3(2) Royalty shall be calculated on the last day of each
month based upon the amount of X sold per month by B.
Royalty shall be paid in cash by the __ day of the
following month.
3(3) A shall not demand additional royalties from B, even if
A registers any right regarding the know-how.
Article 4. Treatment of Improvements
4(1)
In case the parties during the term of this Agreement
develop improvements based upon which they obtain
patent or other rights regarding X, A and B shall at no
charge supply technical data and grant patents or other
rights to each other.
Article 5. Obligation to Protect Confidentiality
5(1) B shall not reveal to others any secrets regarding knowhow.
5(2) A may terminate this Agreement immediately and de-
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mand damages should B breach the preceding paragraph of this Article.
Article 6. Prohibition of Assignment
B shall not transfer any rights or obligations granted
hereunder to a third party.
Article 7. Term of the Agreement
The term of this Agreement shall be __ years from the date
of the execution hereof. This term shall be automatically renewed
for a period of __ years unless either party submits an objection
to the other party __ months before the expiration of this
Agreement.
Article 8. Settlement of Matters not Provided for Hereunder
Matters not provided for hereunder and questions regarding
the interpretation of this Agreement shall be settled by mutual
discussion between A and B.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, two originals of this Agreement
have been made, A and B setting their respective seals hereto and
each retaining one copy.
_ _ _ _ (Date)
Address:
A Company
Representative Director
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [seal]
B Company

Representative Director
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ [seal]
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